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Abstract: Chip-Secured XML Access (C-SXA) is a versatile and tamper-resistant XML-based Access 
Right Controller embedded in a smart card. C-SXA can be used either to protect the privacy of on-
board personal data or to control the flow of data extracted from an external source. Tamper-
resistance is inherited from the smart card for on-board data or achieved using cryptographic 
techniques for external data. C-SXA can provide different views of the same on-board or external 
data depending on the user or application accessing them. Moreover, access control on external 
data can benefit from on-board storage to enforce powerful, context dependant access control 
policies. These two features allow C-SXA to address a wide range of applications such as secure 
portable folders, data sharing among a community of users, parental control and Digital Right 
Management, in a more secure and accurate way than existing technologies. This work relates the 
C-SXA experience. We first motivate the interest of the approach and describe different usage 
scenarios. We then present the internals of C-SXA and show how they tackle the smart card’s 
hardware limitations. Finally, we demonstrate its viability showing how our smart card engine can 
be integrated in a distributed architecture including the smart card, the server and the user terminal, 
making the complete chain from the user to the data secure  
Key words: ubiquitous data management, data confidentiality, XML access control, XML data store, 
smart card. 
1 Introduction 
The rapid growth of ubiquitous computing impels mobile users to store personal data on the Web 
in order to increase data availability and facilitate data sharing among partners.  However, 
Database Service Providers (DSP) arouse user’s suspicion because DSP’s privacy policies have 
been frequently dishonored [AKS02].  In addition, no one can fully trust traditional server-based 
security mechanisms against more and more frequent and malicious attacks [FBI03]. While 
client-based security policies have been historically disregarded considering the vulnerability of 
client environments [Rus01], the emergence of hardware elements of trust in client devices 
drastically changes the situation [BoP02]. Secure tokens and smart cards plugged or embedded 
into different client devices are exploited today in a growing variety of applications (e.g., 
authentication, healthcare folders, digital right management). 
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Chip-Secured XML Access (C-SXA) belongs to this new category of PETs (Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies) taking their security from tamper-resistant hardware devices. C-SXA is a versatile 
XML-based Storage Manager and Access Right Controller embedded in a smart card. It 
evaluates the user’s privileges on on-board or external encrypted XML data and delivers the 
authorized subset of these data. Combining storage and access control in the same secured 
architecture allows tackling accurately two important issues:  
- The first issue is protecting the privacy of personal data embedded in a mobile client device. 
Indeed, the rapid growth of smart card [DH04, Gem04] and MOPASS card [Mop04] stable 
storage capacity (from kilobytes to hundreds megabytes) makes the management of secure 
on-board data realistic and more and more attractive for a wide range of applications. 
- The second issue is controlling the access to external resources through a mobile client 
device. Indeed, the erosion of trust put in traditional database servers and DSP, the growing 
interest for different forms of data dissemination and the concern for protecting children from 
suspicious Internet content are different factors that lead to move the access control from 
servers to secured clients. In that case, the external data are stored externally in an encrypted 
form on a server and are delivered to the client in a streaming fashion. 
Combining on-board XML storage and access control in a smart card brings important 
benefits. First, providing access control management on on-board data allows defining different 
views of the same on-board data for different users or software willing to access these data. This 
functionality is required by applications like secure portable folders (different users may query, 
modify and create data in the holder’s folder) or virtual home environment (different software 
have a partial access to the holder’s environment). Conversely, access control on external data 
can benefit from secured on-board storage to enforce powerful access right policies, in the spirit 
of advanced access right management languages like XrML [XrM]. XrML allows defining rules 
based on historical data (e.g., a user is granted access to given data provided she did, or did not, 
some actions in the past). Past actions have therefore to be recorded securely to avoid any 
tampering1. This combination of features allows C-SXA to address important classes of 
applications, like secured portable folders, data sharing among a community of users (family 
members, relatives or business partners), parental control, teacher control in e-learning 
                                                 
1 Historical data should be stored securely for two reasons: (i) a malicious user may tamper the 
historical data to inhibit the access control; and (ii) tampering may disclose personal 
information, thereby hurting privacy. 
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environments as well as Digital Right Management (DRM), in a more secure and accurate way 
than existing technologies.  
On the one hand, the hardware security features of the smart card guarantee a high tamper-
resistance both for the on-board data and for the access control management engine. On the other 
hand, its severe hardware limitations (very slow writes in stable storage, tiny RAM, constrained 
stable memory, etc.) makes traditional storage and access control technologies irrelevant. In a 
recent paper, we proposed a tamper-resistant streaming evaluator of access control rules for 
regulating access to XML documents [BDP04a]. The proposed solution relies on a non-
deterministic automata engine embedded in a smart card and on a dedicated streaming index 
structure allowing skipping the irrelevant (i.e., forbidden) parts of the input document. Based on 
[BDP04a], we built two JavaCard prototypes running on real smart card platforms. The first one 
implements a hard-coded collaborative agenda application demonstrating the potential of a smart 
client-based access control approach. This prototype focuses more on the application’s aspects 
than on the underlying technology. This work, despite limited, has been rewarded with the silver 
award of the e-gate’04 contest2, showing the growing interests of industrials to enforce access 
control with hardware solutions on client devices. In the second prototype we made a faithful 
implementation of the principles proposed in [BDP04a] and add support for on-board data and 
for XrML like access control rules. Our objective was threefold: (i) to validate the solution 
proposed in [BDP04a] on a real smart card platform; (ii) to show how our smart card engine can 
be integrated in a distributed infrastructure including the smart card, the server and the user 
terminal, making the complete chain from the user to the data secure; and (iii) to illustrate the 
generality of the approach through representative applications exhibiting different profiles wrt 
the data origin (on-board data, external data or both), the way the information is accessed (pull 
vs. push), the type of this information (textual vs. video) and the response time requirements 
(user patience vs. real time).  
This paper relates the C-SXA experience and details the three aforementioned objectives 
and the technological means to reach them. To meet these objectives constitutes a rather 
significant – and complementary – contribution compared to [BDP04a]. 
The sequel of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main application 
                                                 
2 This international contest is organized yearly by Sun, Axalto and ST Microelectronics and 
rewards  innovative smart card applications. 
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domains targeted by C-SXA and discusses the current state of the technology in these domains. 
Section 3 introduces the architecture of C-SXA and illustrates its use through various scenarios. 
Section 4 gives the internal algorithms embedded in the smart card. Section 5 gives a technical 
description of the global infrastructure. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2 Target applications and alternatives 
2.1 Storage and protection of on-board data 
The value of smart cards to secure and share in a controlled way personal information has 
been recognized in several domains like education (scholastic folders), commerce (loyalties), 
telecommunication (address book) or mobile computing (user’s profiles containing licenses, 
passwords, bookmarks, etc) [PBV01] (see Figure 1). MasterCard published recently the 
MasterCard Open Data Storage (MODS) Application Programming Interface “to meet the desire 
expressed by customers to better control how much information they are willing to share with 
whom” [Mas02]. MODS allows retailers, banks and other organizations to access and store data 
on users’ smart cards with an enhanced security for the smart card’s holder. The IBM-Harris 
report on consumer privacy survey strongly highlights this same requirement [IBM]. While the 
need for on-board data management and sharing facilities is clearly established, few technical 
solutions have been proposed yet. 
 
Light versions of popular DBMS like Sybase SQL Anywhere Studio [Syb00], IBM DB2 
Everyplace [KLL+01], Oracle Lite [Ora02] and Microsoft SQL Server for Windows CE [Ses00] 
have been designed, targeting the growing number of mobile phones, PDAs, and other portable 
Access rules
Personal folder
(e.g., Loyalty, Agenda, 
User profile, Healthcare folder)
C-SXA
Figure 1: Storage and protection of on-board data
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consumer devices. These systems have been designed with software portability and footprint 
reduction in mind. However, they do not address the more severe limitations of smart cards. 
Indeed, smart cards have a very specific hardware architecture (Section 3 will highlight this point), 
entailing a thorough re-thinking of database techniques. 
The first attempts towards a smart card DBMS were ISOL’s SQLJava Machine DBMS 
[Car99] and the ISO standard for smart card database language, SCQL [ISO99]. Both were 
addressing generation of smart cards endowed with 8 kilobytes of stable memory. While their 
design was limited to mono-relation queries, they exemplify the strong interest for dedicated smart 
card DBMS. PicoDBMS [PBV01, ABB01], designed by our team, was the first full-fledged 
relational database system embedded in a smart card, supporting a robust subset of the SQL 
standard (and then encompassing SCQL). PicoDBMS is however a complex technology primarily 
designed to manage efficiently huge and well structured embedded folders. Finally, MODS 
[Mas02] is based on flat files and crude access rights (i.e., file level access rights).  
The versatility and wide acceptance of the XML standard [W3C] makes it the best candidate 
today to describe, organize, store and share the variety of data that appear in the above 
applications. Thus, there is a strong need for a native XML data store embedded on chip. To the 
best of our knowledge, C-SXA is the first attempt in this direction.  
2.2 Protection of external data 
Different requirements motivate a secured access to external data from a smart card (see 
Figure 2): (1) the management of personal folders (as above) whose size exceeds the smart card 
storage capacity; (2) the sharing of personal or professional data (e.g., agenda, address book, 
bookmarks, etc) among a community of users (family, friends, colleagues, partners); (3) the 
consumption of information disseminated through a license-based distribution channel or (4) 
accessed freely through the Internet. 
While the internal data are protected by the tamper-resistance of the chip, external data need 
be protected by encryption. The role of encryption differs depending on the source of 
threatening. In cases (1) and (2), encryption is required to preserve the confidentiality of the data 
hosted in untrusted servers, considering the increasing suspicion towards traditional database 
servers [FBI03] and DSP [HIL02]. In case (3), the role of encryption is protecting digital assets 
from illegal access and copying [Sma]. Finally, case (4) refers to the ever-increasing concern of 
parents and teachers to protect children by controlling and filtering out what they access on the 
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Internet [PIC]. To meet this last requirement, encryption can take place in the Web server, in the 
ISP or in the client device communication card while the access control and decryption remains 
confined in the smart card. 
Usually, the data are kept encrypted at the server and a client is granted access to fragments 
of them according to the decryption keys in its possession. Variations of this basic model have 
been designed in different context, such as encrypted backups for personal data [Sky], encrypted 
data hosted by untrusted DSP [HIL02], encrypted relational databases [Ora04, HeW01], for-
profit as well as non-profit publishing [MiS03, BCF01, Sma]. Despite their respective merit, 
these models have in common a static way of sharing data. Indeed, access control policies are all 
precompiled by the encryption, so that changing these policies may incur a partial re-encryption 
of the dataset and/or a potential redistribution of keys.  
 
Unfortunately, there are many situations where access control rules are user specific, 
dynamic and then difficult to predict. In medical folders, the rules protecting the patient’s privacy 
may suffer exceptions in particular situations (e.g., in case of emergency) [ABM03], may evolve 
over time (e.g., depending on the patient’s treatment) and may be subject to provisional 
authorizations [KmS00]. In a data-sharing scenario, the sharing policies change as the initial 
situation evolves (new relationship between users, new partners or friends, new projects with 
diverging interest, etc.). Access control languages like XrML [XrM] or ODRL [ODR] 
demonstrates the need for more expressiveness and flexibility in DRM applications (e.g., Alice 
may listen freely to a piece of music provided she has listened a given amount of commercial 
(1) Management of large personal folders
(3) Digital Right Management
(2) Sharing of personal or professional data
(4) Parental / Teacher control
historical data
Access rules
C-SXA Internet
historical data
Access rules
C-SXA
Video Server
C-SXA C-SXA
Encrypted Data
(e.g., Shared Agenda, 
bookmark, corporate info, )
DSP
Encrypted Data
(e.g., User 
profile, Agenda, 
Healthcare 
folder)
DSP
Access rules
C-SXA
Figure 2: Protection of external data
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before). Finally, neither Web site nor Internet Service Provider can predict the diversity of access 
control rules that parents/teachers with different sensibility are willing to enforce (e.g., rules may 
depends on religious beliefs, political opinions, lecture topics, etc.). 
The goal pursued in our study is being able to evaluate dynamic and personalized access 
control rules on a ciphered input document, with the benefit of dissociating access rights from 
encryption by embedding the access control in a secured chip. Dynamicity can be obtained by 
downloading access control policies in the smart card on demand. In addition, the combination of 
on-board data storage and access control on external data allows for powerful access control 
models based on historical data, in the spirit of XrML and ODRL. 
3 Functional Architecture and Scenarios 
After giving preliminaries on XML access control models, this section details the C-SXA 
architecture and illustrates its utilization through three scenarios, addressing respectively the 
management of external data, the management of on-board data and a mix of both. Finally, it 
discusses briefly how the limitations of the smart card can be tackled to make the approach 
viable. 
3.1 XML access control background 
Roughly speaking, an XML document can be seen as a tree of elements, each one demarcated by 
an opening and closing tag. Attributes may be attached to elements. Terminal elements are 
represented by text. Simple queries can be expressed over an XML document using the XPath 
language. Basically, an XPath expression allows to navigate in the document through the parent 
axis (denoted by /) and the descendant axis (denoted by //) and to apply predicates on elements 
and attributes. The result of an XPath expression is an element (or a group of elements) along 
with its subtree.  
Several authorization models have been recently proposed for regulating access to XML 
documents. We introduce below a simplified access control model for XML, inspired by 
Bertino’s model [BCF01] and Samarati’s model [DDP02] that roughly share the same 
foundation. Subtleties of these models are ignored for the sake of simplicity.   
In this simplified model, access control rules take the form of a 3-uple <sign, subject, object>. 
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Sign denotes either a permission (positive rule) or a prohibition (negative rule) for the read 
operation. Subject denotes a user or a group of users. Object corresponds to elements or subtrees 
in the XML document, identified by an XPath expression. The expressive power of the access 
control model, and then the granularity of sharing, is directly bounded by the supported subset of 
the XPath language. We consider in this paper a rather robust subset of XPath denoted by 
XP{[],*,//} [MiS02]. This subset, widely used in practice, consists of node tests, the child axis 
(/), the descendant axis (//), wildcards (*) and predicates or branches […]. Attributes are handled 
in the model similarly to elements and are not further discussed. 
The cascading propagation of rules is implicit in the model, meaning that a rule propagates 
from an object to all its descendants in the XML hierarchy. Due to this propagation mechanism 
and to the multiplicity of rules for a same user, a conflict resolution principle is required. 
Conflicts are resolved using two policies: 1) Denial-Takes-Precedence, which states that if two 
rules of opposite signs apply on the same object, then the negative one prevails and 2) Most-
Specific-Object-Takes-Precedence, which states that a rule which applies directly to an object 
takes precedence over a propagated rule. Finally, if a subject is granted access to an object, the 
path from the document root to this object is granted too (names of denied elements in this path 
can be replaced by a dummy value). This Structural rule keeps the document structure consistent 
with respect to the original one. 
The set of rules attached to a given subject on a given document is called an access control 
policy. This policy defines an authorized view of this document and, depending on the 
application context, this view may be queried. We consider that queries are expressed with the 
same XPath fragment as access control rules, namely XP{[],*,//}. Semantically, the result of a 
query is computed from the authorized view of the queried document (e.g., predicates cannot be 
expressed on denied elements even if these elements do not appear in the query result). However, 
access control rules predicates can apply on any part of the initial document. 
3.2 C-SXA architecture  
As pictured in Figure 3, the smart card contains the core engine of C-SXA (written in 
JavaCard), which is composed of four modules: the XML local store, the access right controller, 
the query evaluator and the security module. On-board data (like for instance a loyalty profile or 
a personal folder) and the related access control rules are also stored in the smart card stable 
storage. Applications interact with C-SXA thanks to a C-SXA proxy located on the client device 
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(externally to the smart card). This proxy provides a standard XML API to dialog with the 
engine in the card, independently of the underlying communication protocol (APDU). External 
data and their associated access control policies are stored in an encrypted form on an untrusted 
server (e.g., managed by a DSP). 
 
Let us consider an application willing to access local user’s data. This application will first 
authenticate to the smart card (via the proxy) and will express its need by a simple XPath query. 
The C-SXA engine processes this query, computes on the fly the authorized part of the requested 
user’s data, and delivers it to the application (via the proxy). Let us now consider an application 
accessing external data. The communication protocol between the application and the C-SXA 
proxy remains unchanged, making the data localization transparent. Since the C-SXA proxy uses 
the JDBC (Java Data Base Connectivity) protocol, the C-SXA server can be any JDBC enabled 
database system. When the application expresses a query, C-SXA downloads first the access 
control rules related to the queried data and decrypts them. Then, it downloads the data 
themselves in a streaming fashion, decrypts them and processes the query in a way similar to the 
querying of on-board data. 
At this point, let us remark that the C-SXA engine, the Proxy and the Server are totally 
application independent. 
3.3 Scenarios 
External data scenario 
This first scenario deals with collaborative works among a community of users. The objective is 
to organize a confidential data sharing space via an untrusted DSP to exchange textual XML data 
C-SXA
Engine Proxy
C-SXA Proxy
C-SXA
Device hosting the smart card
XML 
Documents
Access Rules
Encrypted 
XML Documents
Encrypted 
Access Rules
Database Server
XMLXPATH
APD
U
XM
L
XP
AT
H
JDBC
Figure 3: Target architecture
C-SXA engine
Application 1 Application 2
XML local store
Access right controller
Query evaluator
Security module
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like agendas, address books, profiles, working drafts, etc. C-SXA permits to define powerful 
access control rules while handling rule dynamicity. Indeed, access control rules are likely to 
evolve while new partners join or leave the community and ad-hoc rules may be defined for 
particular data (e.g., sensitive appointments in an agenda or financial sections in a working 
document). Models compiling access control policies in the data encryption cannot tackle these 
situations accurately. 
In the following, we will consider a collaborative agenda for its representativeness of this class 
of applications. The agenda is actually stored in an encrypted form on a remote server to allow 
its sharing among partners while protecting the confidentiality of its content. Figures 4 pictures 
an XML agenda sample in its usual hierarchical representation. 
 
Let us now consider two users, Alice and Bob, willing to share their remote respective 
agenda through a cellular phone equipped with a C-SXA-enabled SIM card. Alice will first fix 
Bob’s access control policy thanks to a rights management GUI. These rules are translated in 
XPath expressions by the application and stored in an encrypted form in the remote server. 
Figure 5 gives an example of access control policy defined for regulating the access to the 
agenda presented above. This policy states that: by default, nobody is granted access to any 
appointment (rule R1); users belonging to the group Secretary can access all appointments of 
category “work” (rule R2), except the notes that appear in the content (rule R3); a colleague can 
see the appointments of category “work” in which he/she participates (rule R4)3; finally, Bob can 
access all appointments of category “friend” (rule R5). Figure 4 pictures in gray the agenda parts 
that remain hidden to the secretaries.  
 
                                                 
3 Note that context variables can be used to increase the expressiveness of the access control 
Appointment Appointment
Category
Work
General Category
Friend
Start
10:00
End
12:00
Avail.
Busy
Content
Title
E-Gate
Contact
François
General
Start
22:00
End
24:00
Avail.
Out
Content
Title
The Mother
Place
UGC-Nice
....
Figure 4: Hirerarchical representation of an XML agenda
Notes
Check paper
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When Bob connects to the server and asks for Alice’s agenda, C-SXA downloads Bob’s 
access control policy through a secured channel in Bob’s SIM card. Bob can then issue a query 
on Alice’s agenda. C-SXA interprets it, downloads the relevant part of Alice’s agenda in a 
streaming fashion, decrypts it, checks its integrity and evaluates Bob’s access control rules to 
deliver the authorized final result. If Alice is willing to change Bob’s access control policy, she 
uses again the access right management GUI, the new policy is sent to the server and will 
become active the next time Bob connects to Alice’s agenda. 
Many different scenarios dealing with external data can be envisioned. Video distribution is 
an interesting example. A video can be split in sequences, each of which annotated with meta-
data describing the sequence. In a parental control application, parents may forbid their child to 
watch certain sequences containing violent scenes. (e.g., ,  //movie//sequence/[type = 
“violence”]). Video distribution is representative of real-time applications dealing with pushed, 
huge multimedia data while collaborative agenda is representative of asynchronous applications 
dealing with pulled, light textual data. 
On board data scenario 
Secured medical folders have been the focus of many research works. In [ABB01], we 
proposed to manage on-board medical folders thanks to an embedded relational DBMS. 
PicoDBMS allows defining different views of the same folder depending on the privileges of the 
user logged on the smart card (e.g., patient, pharmacist, physician). This first study shown the 
benefit of smart folders (high level of confidentiality for highly sensitive data) and exacerbated 
the need for powerful access control models. However, PicoDBMS is dedicated to well-
structured folders that can be stored into tables. While tables accommodate well the 
administrative data, XML turns to be more convenient to manage the medical data themselves 
due to their much higher irregularity. The need for powerful access control policies is however 
independent of the data model used to organize the data. This advocates for the design of an 
                                                                                                                                                             
rules, e.g. CURRENT_USER corresponds to the user currently connected to the card. 
Rule R1: <PUBLIC, , // Appointment >
Rule R2: <Secretary, ⊕,  // Appointment [ Category = “Work” ] > 
Rule R3: <Secretary, , // Appointment [ Category = “Work” ] /Content/Notes >
Rule R4: <Colleague, ⊕, // Appointment [ // Contact = CURRENT_USER ] / Content >
Rule R5: <Cathy, ⊕, // Appointment [ Category = “Friend” ] >
Figure 5: Access control policy rules
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embedded XML store capable of storing huge and complex XML data and for an access right 
controller capable of evaluating complex access control policies on them. Unlike the preceding 
scenario, access control policies are fixed by a medical authority and are rather stable. Thus, they 
can be installed on the smart card at personalization time (i.e., before the card is actually 
delivered to the patient). However, access control rules may be contextual (e.g., some rules can 
be violated in case of emergency [ABM03, KmS00]) and such situations have to be recorded in 
the smart card stable storage for further controls.  
Scenarios involving both on-board and external data  
As outlined in the introduction, applications relying on XrML or ODRL like access control 
models may authorize users to get access to external data, depending on historical or profile 
information. Storing this information in the smart card is the right way to take advantage of these 
new powerful access control models while enforcing the privacy of this information and 
protecting it against tampering. 
In a DRM context, a special offer may allow a customer to see some bonus sequences for 
free providing she previously completes a survey. In this case, as soon as the user fills in the 
survey, a new entry is appended to the on-board XML repository. The rights defined for the 
bonus sequences can be written as: (⊕, //Bonus[Card://DRM_RECORD=’survey1’]/Content), 
where Card://DRM_RECORD refers to an historical entry stored in the card. When requesting 
the video, the smart card will first evaluate the predicate on DRM_RECORD and perform the 
access using this rule. 
In an e-learning scenario, high school students may have access to view lessons (videos, 
texts and audios) which (a) have been previously selected by their teachers and (b) are related to 
their major. Such rules, though complex, can be expressed in XPath: e.g., (a) ⊕,  
//lesson[contains(keywords, ‘Paris’)];  (b) , //lesson[topic!=%MAJOR%], where %MAJOR% 
refers to the on-board user profile. 
3.4 Scenarios requirements vs. smart card resources 
As the scenarios make clear, a powerful embedded XML store and access right controller is 
highly required. Thus, the question is whether existing smart card platforms are powerful enough 
to support the complexity of the embedded C-SXA engine. In other words, does the global 
approach make sense? Currently, our prototype runs on an e-gate platform equipped with a 32 
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bit CPU running at 30Mhz, 4KB of RAM, 32KB of EEPROM and USB communications at 
16Kbps, provided by our industrial partner Axalto (the Schlumberger’s smart card subsidiary). 
Although Axalto announces more powerful platforms (32 bit CPU running at 40Mhz, 8KB of 
RAM, 1MB of Flash and USB communications at 8Mbps) by the end of this year and that this 
evolution roughly follows the Moore’s law, the smart card will remain the bottleneck of the 
architecture for a while. This bottleneck is mainly due to the decryption cost (of the streaming 
input document), to the low communication bandwidth (to download the document) and at a 
lower extent to the memory. The performance measures summarized in Section 5 show however 
that this bottleneck does not compromise the viability of the aforementioned scenarios, even with 
existing smart card platforms. 
In addition, while performance is an important issue, one must keep in mind that the data 
protection is the main issue here. As the two next sections will make clear, we devised various 
techniques to alleviate the performance problem without sacrificing tamper resistance. First we 
will consider pipeline algorithms based on non-deterministic automata to enforce the access 
control without consuming much memory and to reduce latency thus improving the 
communication speed. Moreover, in order to further reduce the communication flow and thus the 
volume of data to be decrypted, we rely on indexes allowing skipping irrelevant parts of the 
flow. Second, we focus on how the smart card engine can be integrated in the distributed 
architecture, including the server and the user terminal, providing further techniques to reduce 
again the communication flow by splitting the documents in smaller fragments and indexing 
them.  
4 C-SXA engine 
4.1 Queries and access control   
While several access control models for XML have been proposed recently, few papers address 
the enforcement of these models and, to the best of our knowledge, no one considers access 
control in a streaming fashion. At first glance, streaming access control resembles the well-
known problem of XPath processing on streaming documents. There is a large body of work on 
this latter problem in the context of XML filtering [DF03, GMO03, CFG02]. These studies 
consider a very large number of XPath expressions (typically tens of thousands). The primary 
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goal here is to select the subset of queries matching a given document (the query result is not a 
concern) and the focus is on indexing and/or combining a large amount of queries. One of the 
first works addressing the precise evaluation of complex XPath expressions over streaming 
documents is due to [PfC03] which proposes a solution to deliver parts of a document matching 
a single XPath. While access control rules are expressed in XPath, the nature of our problem 
differs significantly from the preceding ones. Indeed, the rule propagation principle along with 
its associated conflict resolution policies (see Section 3) makes access control rules not 
independent. The interference between rules introduces two new important issues: 
− Access control rules evaluation: for each node of the input document, the evaluator must be 
capable of determining the set of rules that applies to it and for each rule determining if it 
applies directly or is inherited. The nesting of the access control rules scopes determines the 
authorization outcome for that node.  
− Access control optimization: the nesting of rule scopes associated with the conflict resolution 
policies inhibits the effect of some rules. The rule evaluator must take advantage of this 
inhibition to suspend the evaluation of these rules and even to suspend the evaluation of all 
rules if a global decision can be reached for a given subtree. 
As streaming documents are considered, we make the assumption that the evaluator is fed by an 
event-based parser (e.g., SAX [SAX]) raising open, value and close events respectively for each 
opening, text and closing tag in the input document.  
We represent each access control rule (i.e., XPath expression) by a non-deterministic finite 
automaton (NFA) [HoU79]. Figure 6.b pictures the Access control rules Automata (ARA) 
corresponding to two rather simple access control rules expressed on an abstract XML 
document. This abstract example, used in place of the motivating example introduced in Section 
3, gives us the opportunity to study several situations (including the trickiest ones) on a simple 
document. In our ARA representation, a circle denotes a state and a double circle a final state, 
both identified by a unique StateId. Directed edges represent transitions, triggered by open 
events matching the edge label (either an element name or *). Thus, directed edges represent the 
child (/) XPath axis or a wildcard depending on the label. To model the descendant axis (//), we 
add a self-transition with a label * matched by any open event. An ARA includes one 
navigational path and optionally one or several predicate paths (in gray in the figure). To 
manage the set of ARA representing a given access control policy, we introduce the following 
data structures: 
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− Tokens and Token Stack: we distinguish between navigational tokens (NT) and predicate 
tokens (PT) depending on the ARA path they are involved in. To model the traversal of an 
ARA by a given token, we actually create a token proxy each time a transition is triggered and 
we label it with the destination StateId. The terms token and token proxy are used 
interchangeably in the rest of the paper. The navigation progress in all ARA is memorized 
thanks to a unique stack-based data structure called Token Stack. The top of the stack 
contains all active NT and PT tokens, i.e. tokens that can trigger a new transition at the next 
incoming event. Tokens created by a triggered transition are pushed in the stack. The stack is 
popped at each close event. The goal of Token Stack is twofold: allowing a straightforward 
backtracking in all ARA and reducing the number of tokens to be checked at each event (only 
the active ones, at the top of the stack, are considered). 
− Rule status and Authorization Stack: Assume for the moment that access control rule 
expressions do not exploit the descendant axis (no //). In this case, a rule is said to be active, – 
meaning that its scope covers the current node and its subtree – if all final states of its ARA 
contain a token. A rule is said pending if the final state of its navigational path contains a 
token while the final state of some predicate path has not yet been reached, i.e., the rule 
depends on predicates (called pending predicates) which occur later in the parsing. The 
Authorization Stack registers the NT tokens having reached the final state of a navigational 
path, at a given depth in the document. The scope of the corresponding rule is bounded by the 
time the NT token remains in the stack. This stack is used to solve conflicts between rules. 
The status of a rule present in the stack can be fourfold: positive-active (denoted by ⊕), 
positive-pending (denoted by ⊕?), negative-active (denoted by ), negative-pending 
(denoted by ?). By convention, the bottom of the stack contains an implicit negative-active 
rule materializing a closed access control policy (i.e., by default, the set of objects the user is 
granted access to is empty). 
− Rule instances materialization: Taking into account the descendant axis (//) in the access 
control rules expressions makes things more complex to manage. Indeed, the same element 
names can be encountered at different depths in the same document, leading several tokens to 
reach the final state of a navigational path and predicate paths in the same ARA, without 
being related together4. To tackle this situation, we label navigational and predicate token 
                                                 
4 The complexity of this problem has been highlighted in [PfC03]. 
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proxies with the depth at which the original predicate token has been created, materializing 
their participation in the same rule instance5. Consequently, a token (proxy) must hold the 
following information: RuleId (denoted by R, S, …), Navigational/Predicate status (denoted 
by n or p), StateId and Depth6. For example, Rn22 and Rp42 (also noted 22, 42 to simplify the 
figures) denotes the navigational and predicate tokens created in Rule R’s ARA at the time 
element b is encountered at depth 2 in the document. If the transition between states 4 and 5 
of this ARA is triggered, a token proxy Rp52 will be created and will represent the progress of 
the original token Rp42 in the ARA. All these tokens refer to the same rule instance since they 
are labeled by the same depth. A rule instance is said active or pending under the same 
condition as before, taking into account only the tokens related to this instance. 
− Predicate Set: this set registers the PT tokens having reached the final state of a predicate 
path. A PT token, representing a predicate instance, is discarded from this set at the time the 
current depth in the document becomes less than its own depth.  
Stack-based data structures are well adapted to the traversal of a hierarchical document. 
However, we need a direct access to any stack level to update pending information and to allow 
some optimizations detailed below. Figure 6.c represents an execution snapshot based on these 
data structures. This snapshot being almost self-explanatory, we detail only a small subset of 
steps.  
- Step 2: the open event b generates two tokens Rn22 and Rp42, participating in the same rule 
instance. 
- Step 3: the ARA of the negative rule S reaches its final state and an active instance of S is 
pushed in the Authorization Stack. The current authorization remains negative. Token Rp52 
enters the Predicate Set. The corresponding predicate will be considered true until level 2 of 
the Token Stack is popped (i.e., until event /b is produced at step 9). Thus, there is no need to 
continue to evaluate this predicate in this subtree and token Rp42 can be discarded from the 
                                                 
5 To illustrate this, let us consider the rule R and the right subtree of the document presented in 
Figure 6. The predicate path final state 5 (expressing //b[c]) can be reached from two different 
instances of b, respectively located at depth 2 and 3 in the document, while the navigational 
path final state 3 (expressing //b/d) can be reached only from b located at depth 3. Thus, a 
single rule instance is valid here, materialized by navigational and predicate tokens proxies 
labeled with the same depth 3. 
6 If a same ARA contains different predicate paths starting at different levels of the navigational 
path, a NT token will have in addition to register all PT tokens related to it. 
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Token Stack. 
- Step 5: An active instance of the positive rule R is pushed in the Authorization Stack. The 
current authorization becomes positive, allowing the delivery of element d. 
- Step 16: A new instance of R is pushed in the Authorization Stack, represented by token Rn33. 
This instance is pending since the token Rp52 pushed in the Predicate Set at step 12 (event c) 
does not participate in the same rule instance.  
- Step 18: Token Rp53 enters the Predicate Set, changing the status of the associated rule 
instance to positive-active.  
4.2 Conflict Resolution 
From the information kept in the Authorization Stack, the outcome of the current document node 
can be easily determined. The conflict resolution algorithm presented in Figure 7 integrates the 
closed access control policy (line 1), the Denial-Takes-Precedence (line 2) and Most-Specific-
Object-Takes-Precedence (lines 5 and 7) policies to reach a decision. In the algorithm, AS 
denotes the Authorization Stack and AS[i].RuleStatus denotes the set of status of all rules 
registered at level i in this stack. In the first call of this recursive algorithm, depth corresponds to 
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the top of AS. Recursion captures the fact that a decision may be reached even if the rules at the 
top of the stack are pending, depending on the rule status found in the lower stack levels. Note, 
however, that the decision can remain pending if a pending rule at the top of the stack conflicts 
with other rules. In that case, the current node has to be buffered, waiting for a delivery 
condition. This issue is tackled in [BDP04b]. The rest of the algorithm is self-explanatory and 
examples of conflict resolutions are given in the figure. 
DecideNode(depth) → Decision ∈ {⊕, ,?} 
1: If depth = 0 then  return ‘ ’  
2:  elseif ‘ ’∈ AS[depth].RuleStatus then return ‘ ’   
3:   elseif ‘⊕’ ∈ AS[depth].RuleStatus and  
4:      ‘ ?’ ∉ AS[depth].RuleStatus then return ‘⊕’ 
5:    elseif DecideNode(depth - 1) = ‘ ’ and  
6:      ∀t∈{‘⊕?’,‘⊕’} t∉ AS[depth].RuleStatus then return ‘ ’ 
7:     elseif DecideNode(depth - 1) = ‘⊕’ and  
8:        ‘ ?’ ∉ AS[depth] RuleStatus then return ‘⊕’ 
9:      else return ‘?’ 
 
The DecideNode algorithm presented below considers only the access control rules. Things are 
slightly more complex if queries are considered too. Queries are expressed in XPath and are 
translated in a non-deterministic finite automaton in a way similar to access control rules. 
However, a query cannot be regarded as an access control rule at conflict resolution time. The 
delivery condition for the current node of a document becomes twofold: (1) the delivery decision 
must be true and (2) the query must be interested in this node. The first condition is the outcome 
of the DecideNode algorithm. The second condition is matched if the query is active, that is if all 
final states of the query ARA contain a token, meaning that the current node is part of the query 
scope. 
4.3 Optimization issues 
A possible optimization is to suspend dynamically the evaluation of ARA that become irrelevant 
or useless inside a subtree. The knowledge gathered in the Token Stack, Authorization Stack and 
Θ
Θ?
⊕
Θ
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Θ
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Θ
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Figure 7: Conflict resolution algorithm
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Predicate Set can be exploited to this end. The first optimization is to suspend the evaluation of a 
predicate in a subtree as soon as an instance of this predicate has been evaluated to true in this 
subtree. This optimization has been illustrated by Step 3 of Figure 6.c. The second optimization 
is to evaluate dynamically the containment relation between active and pending rules and take 
benefit of the elimination condition mentioned above. From the Authorization Stack, we can 
detect situations where the following local condition holds: (T ⊂ S ⊆ R) ∧ (R.Sign=S.Sign ∧ 
S.Sign≠T.Sign), the stack levels reflecting the containment relation inside the current subtree. S 
can be inhibited in this subtree. If stopping the evaluation of some ARA is beneficial, one must 
keep in mind that the two limiting factors of our architecture are the decryption cost and the 
communication cost. Therefore, the real challenge is being able to take a common decision for 
complete subtrees, a necessary condition to detect and skip prohibited subtrees, thereby saving 
both decryption and communication costs. 
Without any additional information on the input document, a common decision can be taken for 
a complete subtree rooted at node n iff: (1) the DecideNode algorithm can deliver a decision D 
(either ⊕ or ) for n itself and (2) a rule R whose sign contradicts D cannot become active 
inside this subtree (meaning that all its final states, of navigational path and potential predicate 
paths, cannot be reached altogether). These two conditions are compiled in the algorithm 
presented in Figure 8. In this algorithm, AS denotes the Authorization Stack, TS the Token 
Stack, TS[i].NT (resp. TS[i].PT) the set of NT (resp. PT) tokens registered at level i in this stack 
and top is the level of the top of a stack. In addition, t.RuleInst denotes the rule instance 
associated with a given token, Rule.Sign the sign of this rule and Rule.Pred a Boolean indicating 
if this rule includes predicates in its definition.  
The immediate benefit of this algorithm is to stop the evaluation for any active NT tokens and 
the main expected benefit is to skip the complete subtree if this decision is . Note however that 
only NT tokens are removed from the stack at line 6. The reason for this is that active PT tokens 
must still be considered, otherwise pending predicates could remain pending forever. As a 
conclusion, a subtree rooted at n can be actually skipped iff: (1) the decision for n is , (2) the 
DecideSubtree algorithm decides  and (3) there are no PT token at the top of the Token Stack 
(which turns to be empty). Unfortunately, these conditions are rarely met together, especially 
when the descendant axis appears in the expression of rules and predicates. The next section 
introduces a Skip index structure that gives useful information about the forthcoming content of 
the input document. The goal of this index is to detect a priori rules and predicates that will 
become irrelevant, thereby increasing the probability to meet the aforementioned conditions. 
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DecideSubtree() → Decision ∈ {⊕, ,?} 
1: D = DecideNode(AS.top)  
2:  if D = ‘?’ then return ‘?’ 
3: if not (∃ nt ∈TS[top].NT / nt.Rule.Sign ≠ D 
4:           and (not nt.Rule.Pred 
5:                or (∃ pt ∈TS[top].PT / pt.RuleInst = nt.RuleInst)) 
6:  then TS[top].NT = ∅; return (D) 
7:   else return ‘?’ 
Figure 8: Decision on a complete subtree 
When queries are considered, any subtree not contained in the query scope is candidate to a skip. 
This situation holds as soon as the NT token of the query (or NT tokens when several instances 
of the same query can co-exist) becomes inactive (i.e., is no longer element of TS[top].NT). This 
token can be removed from the Token Stack but potential PT tokens related to the query must 
still be considered, again to prevent pending predicate to remain pending forever. As before, the 
subtree will be actually skipped if the Token Stack becomes empty. 
5 Distributed infrastructure 
This section focuses on the way the C-SXA engine can be integrated in a distributed architecture 
including the smart card, the server and the user terminal. This integration is an important issue, 
considering the fact that the tamper resistance of the access control relies not only on the smart 
card but also on the whole environment (e.g., communication protocol, access rights update 
protocol, etc.). This issue has not been deeply discussed in [BDP04b], where the focus was put 
on the components embedded in the smart card. 
On-board storage model 
The main requirements of the storage model are first, to provide a compact representation of the 
XML data (while increasing, the smart card stable storage capacity is still limited) and second to 
offer an efficient scheme to converge quickly towards the authorized fragments of these data. In 
[BDP04a] we proposed a recursive indexation structure primarily designed to skip the irrelevant 
part of a streaming external document. We explain below how this structure has been adapted to 
serve as a compact indexed storage model for the on-board data.  
 The document structure is compressed thanks to a dictionary of element names, also called tags 
[ABC04]. In most cases, the dictionary may be disclosed since it is generally not confidential. 
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Then, we append to every XML element, the size of its subtree as well as a bitmap representing 
all the tags present in its subtree. The bitmap is used to decide whether a rule may or not be 
active in the subtree (e.g., the rule //a//c cannot apply on a subtree containing only the tags a and 
d). In some situations stated in Section 4.3, the subtree can be skipped thanks to the size 
attribute. This extra information is compressed recursively using the following basic idea. For 
each node, the corresponding set of tags is encoded as a bit array referring to its parent set of tags 
and the subtree size is encoded on the number of bits required to encode its parent subtree size. 
External storage model 
In order to reduce the communication and decryption costs, a document is split into fragments. 
When a client issues a query, only the fragments relevant for this query are downloaded. The 
scope and size of fragments are determined by the application. To illustrate this, in the Agenda 
application, each fragment corresponds to a particular day. 
In our prototype the remote storage is delegated to a relational database server (MySQL). 
The main tables are represented in Figure 9. Columns pictured in gray are encrypted thanks to 
the owner secret key (see next subsection). The XPath column is a (compressed) XPath 
expression identifying each fragment of a document, itself identified by (owner, type). Type and 
XPath can be stored in plaintext provided they do not divulgate confidential information7. Note 
that the XPath (for documents) and RuleId (for rules) are stored both in plaintext and encrypted 
form in order to allow the smart card checking the correspondence between client request and 
server answer. Otherwise, malicious users could substitute encrypted data to gain access to 
unauthorized one. 
                                                 
7 Potential inference on the external data can be avoided by inserting dummy appointments 
1 2[2004] 3[03] 4[20] 5 6[Perso] 7 8[10:00] 9[12:00] 10[Out] 11 15[Sport] 13[…
5 6[Perso] 7 8[13:00] 9[16:00] 10[Out] 11 15[Museum] …
1 2[2004] 3[03] 4[19] 5 6[Work] 7 8[08:00] 9[12:00] 10[Busy] 11 12[Luc] 13[ACI …
5 6[Perso] 7 8[22:00] 9[24:00] 10[Out] 11 15[Cinema] …
1 2[2004] 3[03] 4[18] 5 6[Work] 7 8[08:00] 9[12:00] 10[Busy] 11 12[Luc] 13[ACI …
5 6[Work] 7 8[14:00] 9[17:00] 10[Busy] 11 12[François] ….. Philippe Agenda
Philippe Agenda
Philippe Agenda
2[2004]  3[03]  4[18]
2[2004]  3[03]  4[19]
2[2004]  3[03]  4[20]
XPathOwner Type
1100111000100
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1100111000111
N-gram Encrypted data
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Type
Luc
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7
8
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7   ⊕ : //Appointment[//Contact = "Luc"]/Content
8  ⊕ : //Appointment/General
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Figure 9: Data stored on the server
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To enable keyword searches on a document without having to download all its fragments, 
each fragment is indexed using n-grams [HIL02]. We consider a set of n-grams denoted by 
N={n1, n2, …} where n1, n2 are strings of at most n characters. Based on this set of n-grams, the 
fragment index value is defined as a bitmap where each bit corresponds to an n-gram in N. A bit 
is set if the corresponding n-gram is present in the fragment. For instance, let N be {“te”, “ta”, 
“se”} and let a fragment F contain the text “white house”, the index value of F is 101. To make a 
keyword search, a bitmap value V is computed from the keywords and is compared to every 
fragment index values using the AND logical operator. If the result equals V, then the fragment 
is a potential candidate and is thus downloaded. For example, if the word “house” is searched, V 
equals 001. The result of V AND 101 equals V, so the fragment may contain the word “house”. 
Let us now see how this index is actually exploited. Upon receiving a query, the terminal first 
computes the bitmap value V based on a set of public n-grams stored locally. This value is sent 
to the smart card which encrypts it using a secret key. The resulting value EV is then sent to the 
server which compares it to all its index values (previously encrypted with the same key). The 
server then returns the candidate fragments of the document. The overhead incurred by this index 
is rather small, the smart card doing only the encryption of the index value, the computation of 
the index on the terminal being negligible. 
Confidentiality and integrity 
In our context, the attacker can be the user himself. For instance, a user being granted access 
to an appointment X may try to extract unauthorized information from an appointment Y. Let us 
assume that the document is encrypted with a classic block cipher algorithm (e.g., DES or triple-
DES) and that blocks are encrypted independently (e.g., following the ECB mode [Sch96]), 
identical plaintext blocks will generate identical ciphered values. In that case, the attacker can 
conduct different attacks: substituting some blocks of appointments X and Y to mislead the 
access control manager and decrypt part of Y; building a dictionary of known 
plaintext/ciphertext pairs from authorized information (e.g., X) and using it to derive 
unauthorized information from ciphertext (e.g., Y); making statistical inference on ciphertext. 
Additionally, if no integrity checking occurs, the attacker can randomly modify some blocks, 
inducing a dysfunction of the rule processor (e.g., Bob is authorized to access appointments 
starting after 6 PM and he randomly alters the ciphertext storing the starting time). 
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To face these attacks, we exploit two techniques. Encryption and hashing are required to 
guarantee respectively the confidentiality and the integrity of external documents and access 
control rules. Standard integrity checking methods must be adapted to tackle the memory 
limitation of the smart card. This imposes to implement integrity checking in a streaming 
fashion.  
Regarding encryption, the objective is to generate different ciphertexts for different 
instances of a same value. This property is obtained by using a Cipher Bloc Chaining (CBC) 
mode in place of ECB, meaning that the encryption of a block depends on the preceding block 
[Sch96].  
Regarding integrity checking, the document is split into chunks whose size is determined by 
the memory capacity of the smart card. Each chunk contains an encrypted ChunkDigest 
(computed using a collision resistant hash function (e.g., SHA-1). To avoid chunk substitution or 
removal, a chunk digest is computed over the union between the chunk content itself and the 
digest of the preceding chunk (see figure 10.a). The document is thus protected against 
tampering and confidentiality attacks while remaining agnostic regarding the encryption 
algorithm used to cipher the elementary data.  
 
Key distribution 
Separating data encryption from access control allows using potentially a single encryption key 
for all documents and access control rules present in the system. However, to increase security 
and robustness, several keys can be used, e.g., one per user. In this case, when Alice wants to 
share (part of) her document with Bob, Alice’s secret key must be transmitted to Bob’s smart 
card. A secure key distribution is implemented by means of a classical Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI).  
Figure 10: Integrity
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Secured communications 
Messages transmitting documents and rules have to be protected against tampering (e.g., Bob 
may try to drop all negative rules transmitted by the server). To avoid checking integrity twice 
(at the communication level and at the rule/document chunk level), the message digest is 
computed on the message header and on the rule/document digest, as pictured in Figure 10.b and 
c. Finally, an increasing counter is added to each message to prevent replay attacks (e.g., Bob 
may try to substitute a rule update message with an old one containing no negative rules).  
Performance assessment 
On-board data management is obviously less expensive than external data management since the 
latter incurs an extra communication and decryption cost and may apply on larger documents. 
This section thus focuses on the management of external data. The discussion below summarizes 
the results of performance evaluations conducted both on the JavaCard e-gate platform described 
in Section 3.4 (30Mhz CPU, 4KB of RAM, 32KB of EEPROM and 16Kbps USB 
communications) and on a cycle-accurate hardware simulator provided by Axalto simulating 
faithfully the behavior of forthcoming smart card platforms (40Mhz CPU, 8KB of RAM, 1MB 
of Flash and 8Mbps USB communications). The prototype running on the cycle-accurate 
simulator has been rewritten in C, allowing predicting exactly the performance of the C-SXA 
engine on a real (i.e., industrial) setting.  
The experiments related to the C prototype have been conducted both on real and synthetic data 
sets, each of which exhibiting different characteristics (shallow vs. deep documents, few vs. 
many distinct tags, non-recursive vs. recursive documents) and apply access control rules of 
varying complexity (non-recursive vs. recursive, few vs. many predicates). We showed that the 
access control time, representing 5% to 15% of the total response time is negligible wrt the 
decryption time (50% to 60%) and the communication time (about 30%). We showed that our 
method tackles well very different situations and produces a throughput ranging from 55KB/s to 
85KB/s depending on the document and the access control policy. These preliminary results as 
encouraging when compared with xDSL Internet bandwidth available nowadays (ranging from 
16KB/s to 128KB/s). The complete performance evaluation can be found in [BDP04a]. 
The performance of our JavaCard e-gate prototype has been assessed on two applications: a 
collaborative agenda and a video application. The first one implements the application as 
described in Section 3 and exhibits acceptable performance, e.g., retrieving appointments of a 
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single day from the server takes few seconds. However, the e-gate smart card platform shows its 
limits when dealing with large objects, especially when response times have to be congruent with 
real time constraints (e.g., in video applications). In this context the limiting factors are the 
decryption time and above all the communication throughput. To solve this problem, we trade 
security for performance as follows. We consider videos encoded using the MPEG7 standard, 
which allows storing short descriptions of the scenes in the XML metadata. On the server, the 
metadata are stored encrypted and the video sequences are encrypted according to secret keys 
stored in that metadata. The smart card performs the access control on the XML metadata and 
delivers the decryption keys to the media player, according to the user’s privileges (see Figure 
11). The media player then downloads, decrypts and displays the authorized sequences (i.e., the 
ones for which it got the proper decryption keys). Since the decryption of the video sequences is 
performed on the terminal, video sequences can be played in real time and only a short latency 
(few seconds) is necessary at the beginning to process the metadata in the smart card. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed a smart card based architecture to enforce powerful and dynamic 
access control policies on confidential data and to guarantee the tamper resistance of these data. 
We showed that this architecture can be used in various contexts, such as secured personal 
folders, collaborative works, parental and teacher control and advanced DRM applications. 
Combining on-board XML storage and access control in a smart card provides important 
benefits, like the definition of different authorized views of the on-board data for different users 
and the definition of powerful access control policies where rules are defined on historical (or 
any other contextual) on-board data.  
Figure 11: Parental control
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To tackle the drastic hardware constraints of the smart card, we proposed: (i) efficient algorithms 
to evaluate access control rules on streaming XML data, (ii) a highly compact storage and 
indexation model for both on-board and external data enabling and (iii) ad-hoc encryption and 
integrity control mechanisms preventing tampering and confidentiality attacks. Finally we 
assessed the viability of our approach through experiments conducted on current and future 
smart card platforms. Current smart cards are still limited and cannot match strong response time 
constraints but, as STMicroelectronics announces, more powerful smart cards capable of 
managing video streams in real-time are currently being developed. They will break the current 
smart card limitations and thus give a new dimension to the C-SXA approach. Although our 
architecture relies today on a smart card, it can accommodate any other form of hardware 
secured device (e.g., chip secured set-top-boxes, smart tokens, secured co-processors).  
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